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and clarify the Ohio statutes and save them from a charge of obscurity.
Besides making the Roth test mandatory by statute, the holding in
Blumenstein will undoubtedly accelerate its evaluation in the courts so
that if this standard is to be found wanting, as all such standards have
been so found since ancient times, it may be brought sooner to the at-
tention of the Supreme Court of the United States.
FRANK BERNDT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
Porter v. United States, 270 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1959)
In Porter v. United States,' the defendant was arrested, indicted for
rape, arraigned upon a plea of not guilty, and imprisoned when he found
it impossible to raise the cost of a bail bond. Failing to get what he
considered an adequate defense from a court-appointed lawyer, he wrote
a letter from prison to the Chief Justice of the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, in which he daimed his right to "due process of law"
had been denied. His claim was based on the fact that his trial in the
District Court had been postponed five times resulting in a delay of one
hundred and fifty days.? In his letter to the judge, Porter asked for a
motion for a direct acquittal or a motion for a speedy trial, whichever was
proper in his situation. The District Court refused these motions.
Although the court's opinion in this case recognized the presence of
three important issues, the decision was based on one - whether there
was infringement of Porter's constitutional right to a speedy trial.' This
right is reserved in the Sixth Amendment of the Bill of Rights:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed.. .4
and is reiterated in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
1. 270 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 805 (1960).
2. According to the record of the District Court, the dates and reasons for the postponements
were as follows:
2-18-58 defense counsel was snowbound;
3-11-58 at government request because complaining witness was ill;
3-31-58 the length of the preceding cases prevented its being heard;
4-24-58 prosecutor was engaged in trial;
5-1-58 at government request because witness was on leave;
5-20-58 trial was held.
3. The two issues of this case raised by the court but considered insignificant to its conclu-
sion were: (1) whether the constitutional guaranty to a speedy trial is a personal right which
is waived by the failure of the accused to demand trial; and (2) whether there is a responsibility
on the court to appoint a new attorney in the situation where the accused and the court-ap-
pointed attorney differ as to the method of defense and where it appears the defense is not
being presented in a manner most favorable to the accused.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury
or in filing an information against a defendant who has been held to
answer to the district court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing
a defendant to trial, the court may dismiss the indictment, information
or complaint.5
The Court of Appeals, by a 2-1 majority, affirmed the District Court's
decision, holding that Porter's right to a speedy trial had not been denied.
In a one paragraph opinion, the majority based its decision on the finding
in King v. United States.s
The fact situation in the King case was similar to that in the Porter
case. In reaching the decision that King had not been denied his right
to a speedy trial, the majority of the court emphasized two factors:
(1) that sixty days of the one hundred and forty-day delay were at the
request of the accused and not the prosecutor; and (2) after postpone-
ment as requested by the defendant, the court's calendar system necessi-
tated continued delay.7 Recognizing that the constitutional right to a
speedy trial is relative and must be determined in light of all the factors
in each case, the majority refused to void the calendar system so long as
a better method was unknown and further refused to bring the King case
within the limits of the constitutional guaranty.'
A close analysis of the reasoning of the court in the King case and
that of the dissenting judge in the Porter case is necessary to accentuate
the problems presented in these cases.
The court in the King case emphasized the fact that the defendant
had requested the delays. Repeatedly this has been held to estop the
accused from asserting a denial of his right to a speedy trial.9 In More-
land v. United States'" the court said, "A defendant cannot complain that
he has been denied a speedy trial by reason of delay which he himself
caused."" Similarly in United States v. Lustman,' it was said, "The
Sixth Amendment prohibits only an unreasonable delay and a defendant
5. FEDR. CR&. P. 48 (b).
6. 265 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 998 (1959).
7. When a case was set for trial in a district court, there was no way of knowing if court
rooms would be vacant, if judges would be available, or if the case would be ready on that
date. If the trial date was reached and a postponement required or requested, the case was
not moved to the succeeding day, but to the first available date following the cases on the cal-
endar, usually resulting in a delay of thirty days with each postponement. This procedure
was followed disregarding the fact that the accused was imprisoned during this period.
8. King v. United States, 265 F.2d 567, 570 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 998
(1959). See Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905); Day v. Davis, 235 F.2d 379 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 881 (1956).
9. United States ex rel. Hanson v. Ragen, 166 F.2d. 608 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 849 (1948); Shepard v. United States, 163 F2d 974 (8th Cir. 1947); United States v.
Stracuzza, 158 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), affd, 362 U.S. 511 (1960).
10. 193 F.2d 297 (10th Cir. 1951).
11. Id. at 298.
12. 258 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958).
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cannot exploit a delay which is attributable primarily to his own acts or
to which he has consented."' It appeared that the court in the King
case recognized the duty of the prosecutor to protect the constitutional
rights of the accused, and the court would have protected them if the
delays had been at the prosecutor's request. It seemed so until the Porter
case, where the same court ignored the factor it had considered significant
in the previous case. There was no mention of the delays caused by the
prosecutor, in fact there was no majority opinion on this subject.
Judge Bazelon, dissenting in the Porter case, did not ignore this fac-
tor. He pointed out that three of the five delays were at the request of
the prosecutor while the accused requested none. This, he said, violated
the prosecutor's duty to protect the constitutional rights of the accused, 4
a duty which increased with each delay of the trial. As stated in United
States v. Dillon,5 "It is the duty of the public prosecutor, not only to
prosecute those charged with crimes, but also to observe the constitutional
mandate guaranteeing a speedy trial."' 6 Based on the fact that the delays
were caused by the accused in the King case and by the prosecutor in the
Porter case, Judge Bazelon differentiated the latter case and supported
the opposite result.
The second factor emphasized by the majority in the King case was
the problem that resulted from the procedure used by the district courts
in placing cases on their calendars. The court recognized the imperfec-
tions but dismissed them as "necessary evils" to the administration of jus-
tice. The dissenting opinion considered these imperfections in a differ-
ent manner:
The majority appears to conclude that the 6th amendment does not
require a calendar system which is idealistically perfect, but only one
which is reasonable in view of the hard facts. While I agree that the
constitutional right to a speedy trial is consistent with necessary delays
inherent in the processes of justice, I cannot agree that it permits proc-
esses that make for unnecessary or avoidable delay.17
Here is the question that the court was forced to answer - To what
extent would it permit administrative inadequacies to infringe upon con-
stitutional rights? Judge Bazelon, basing his dissent on the supremacy of
constitutional rights, declined to give these inadequacies any weight.
13. Id. at 477.
14. Porter v. United States, 270 F.2d 453, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (dissent), cert. denied,
363 U.S. 805 (1960). See State v. Crosby, 217 Ore. 393, 342 P.2d 831, (1959); State v.
Chadwick, 150 Ore. 645, 47 P.2d 232 (1935).
15. 183 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
16. Id. at 543.
17. King v. United States, 265 F.2d 567, 572 (D.C. Cir.) (dissent), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 998 (1959).
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CONCLUSION
It is appropriate at a time when the rights of men are being tested
in courts throughout the country that the rights of a person, imprisoned
without a trial for one hundred and fifty days because he was without the
cost of a bail bond, be carefully examined. Although the dilemma the
court faced in both the King case and the Porter case was relatively
simple in fact, it has widespread ramifications; for example, what is the
prosecutor's duty to see that the accused is not denied his constitutional
rights; and, when does the inherent power of a court to control its calen-
dar violate the constitutional right to a speedy trial? Rather than meet
these questions on the constitutional issue, the majority of the court in
the Porter case deemed the causes of the delays insignificant and called
the court procedure a weakness in the administration of justice.
The questions left unanswered by these cases demonstrate the inde-
cision that hovers over this area. It appears reasonable that the dissent-
ing opinion in the Porter case should establish the guideposts for a re-
evaluation of the rights belonging to a person finding himself imprisoned
for a long period without a trial. From that opinion it is justifiable to
conclude: first, that the prosecutor has an intense duty to preserve the
constitutional guarantees of a person in this situation; and second, that
the federal district courts should adopt a calendar procedure that meets
the problem."8 The mere recognition of these principles will not suffice.
The courts must depend on the foresight of men to develop systematic
and efficient administration of justice in a manner that protects the liber-
ties of human beings.
RiCHARD H. KRAUSHAAR
18. Since the Porter case the District Court for the District of Columbia has changed its
calendar rule by placing the continued case on the docket for the next available date, but by
placing it near the top of that day's list rather than at the bottom. This assures its hearing
on that date and results in a maximum delay of three weeks. 108 U. PA. L. REv. 414 (1960).
This article states that the problem still remains in most federal courts and suggests as a solu-
tion a uniform and definitive provision similar to that adopted in the District of Columbia.
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